Endogenous Political Institutions by Philippe Aghion et al.











We thank Daron Acemoglu, Marios Angeletos, Olivier Blanchard, Stefano Della Vigna, Jeffrey Frieden, Ed
Glaeser, Elhanan Helpman, Bryan Graham, Oliver Hart, Miklos Koren, Vardges Levonyan, Matthew
Jackson, Andrei Shleifer, Adam Szeidl, Motohiro Yogo, and seminar participants at CBRSS, CIAR,
Columbia, Copenhagen, Harvard, MIT, NYU, Stockholm, University of Pennsylvania and the Mc Arthur
Foundation group on inequality for helpful comments. Federico Etro provided excellent research assistance.
Alesina and Aghion grate-fully acknowledge financial support from the NSF through the NBER and from
the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research respectively.  The views expressed herein are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2002 by Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina and Francesco Trebbi.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of
text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.Endogenous Political Institutions
Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina and Francesco Trebbi
NBER Working Paper No. 9006
June 2002
ABSTRACT
Political institutions influence economic policy, but they are themselves endogenous since they
are chosen, in some way, by members of the polity. An important aspect of institutional design is how
much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be
restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader
faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical
constitutional choice we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely
the size of the (super) majority needed to govern. We analyze both "optimal" constitutional design and
"positive" aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss.
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Political institutions contribute to determine the choice of economic policies,
which, in turn, determine economic success.1 However, institutions themselves
are chosen by individuals and they evolve in response to changing politico-
economic conditions. Thus, in order to fully understand and properly test
empirically the economic eﬀects of institutions on economic policies and out-
comes, one has to allow for the endogenous choice of the latter. The goal of this
paper is to highlight how several characteristics of a society lead to diﬀerent
institutional choices.
We focus on a very general feature of political institutions and we label it the
degree of ”insulation” of policymakers. An insulated leader2,o n c ea p p o i n t e d ,
can rule with little or no ex post control. A non insulated one, instead, has to
form large majorities to pass legislation and many groups may have veto power
ex post. Alternatively, one can view this question as the determination of the
(super)majority needed to pass legislation.
Classical political theorists were well aware of the importance of this aspect
of constitutional design. For instance, in Democracy In America, Alexis de
Tocqueville stressed that ”Our contemporaries are incessantly racked by two
inimical passions; they feel the need to be led and the wish to remain free”3.
The Founding Fathers well recognized this dilemma. For instance, in the Fed-
eralist paper n. 70 Hamilton writes that “Taking for granted ..that all men of
sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic executive, it will only remain to
inquire what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far can they
be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the Repub-
lican sense?” The theory of checks and balances, embodied in the work by
Montesquieu (1748) provided the answer adopted by the framers of the Amer-
ican Constitution. More speciﬁcally, the question of supermajorities as a way
to restrain the ”tyranny of the majority” features prominently in the Constitu-
tional theory by Hayek (1960) and in Buchanan and Tullock (1962). The latter,
for instance, argue that the simple majority rule does not have any particular
”superior” standing and under certain conditions may lead to excessive costs
imposed on individual liberties by collective action.
We model ”insulation” as the share of votes needed to block legislation to
pass, or, to put it in reverse, we look at the size of the (super)majority that
the leader has to command to pass legislation. The “Constitution” establishes
1For a broad empirical discussion on how institutions aﬀect economic policy see Persson
and Tabellini (2002) and the references cited therein. For recent empirical work on the eﬀect
of institutions on ﬁscal policy see Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002). For the eﬀect
of democracy on growth see Barro (1996). Gil, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2002) argue that
the eﬀect of political institutions on social security is small, contrary to arguments by Persson
and Tabellini (2002).
2We use the terms leader, policymaker and politician interchangeably.
3Volume 2, part 4, Chapter 6, page 664 from the translation by Mansﬁeld and Winthrop
(2000).
2the degree of insulation, and we abstract from all other institutional details.
We analyze ﬁrst the case of a ”perfect democracy” in which all citizens are
truly behind a veil of ignorance at the time of the constitutional choice and
all have a vote in this choice. We show how various features of the politico-
economic environment aﬀect this choice, including: the distribution of voter
preferences; the nature of uncertainty; the feasibility and costs of compensating
the losers from policy reforms; the possibility for leaders to expropriate citizens;
the average beneﬁts and costs of potential policy reforms; the degree of risk
aversion.
Second, we investigate the political economy of institutional design. That
is, we discuss how the optimal choice of institutions would or would not be
adopted in a system where the choice was not made completely behind a veil of
ignorance and/or only a fraction of the population has a voice in the choice of
institutions. What we have in mind is a situation in which those who choose a
Constitution are also those who know who will control political oﬃce after the
Constitution is ratiﬁed. In this case, what is optimal for those who choose the
Constitution may not be optimal for society as a whole.
Our model delivers several results with clear empirical implications. Al-
though the present paper is mainly theoretical, the goal of this research project
is empirically motivated and in the last section of the paper we discuss some
empirical implications and predictions of our model. More extensive empirical
work will be the focus of future research.
Related to the present paper is a recent literature on “choosing how to
choose”, i.e. voting on voting rules. Aghion and Bolton (1997) introduce an
incomplete contract methodology to analyze the normative choice of optimal
majority rule. Maskin and Tirole (2001) provide a somewhat related discus-
sion of government accountability. Barbera and Jackson (2001) investigate the
endogenous choice of a majority voting rule, investigating conditions of exis-
tence of a self-stable voting rule, an issue that we will revisit below. Koray
(2000) explores instead social choice functions and whether such functions are
self-selecting. In an overlapping generations setting Polborn and Messner (2002)
identify a trade oﬀ arising in the selection of voting mechanisms over a reform
when only part of the population (the old) incurs the cost of the reform, but
not the subsequent beneﬁts.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model and
its interpretation. Section 3 solves the model and derives basic comparative
statics results. Section 4 illustrates several extensions. Section 5 discusses
the “political economy” of writing constitutions. Section 6 highlights several
empirical implications of our model and brings about empirical support. The
last section highlights plans for future research.
32 Political Insulation
2.1 The Model
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of individuals, assumed, for the
moment, to be risk-neutral with respect to income. Members of this polity will
diﬀer ex post on how much they beneﬁt from policy actions (labelled ”reforms”)
which may be implemented. If no reform is implemented, all individuals obtain
the same income, which we normalize at 1. Individual income from the policy
reform is given by:4
e yi =
½
e λiγ if reform occurs
1o t h e r w i s e
with γ > 0( 1 )
where
e λi = λi + a,




From now on, we label l = λ − λ.ais a random variable with mean zero,
uniformly distributed between [−A,A], where A>0. We use the uniform
distribution to obtain simple closed-form solutions, but below and in Appendix
we show how our results generalize. Note that if λmγ > 1 the policy reform
is ex ante eﬃcient in the sense that it makes the average (and median) voter
better oﬀ.
This community selects a leader to promote and implement reforms. With
exogenously given probability p the selected leader is ”good” and promotes the
reform; with probability (1 − p) the leader is ”bad” and expropriates (in the
broad sense of the term) the polity. Next section on interpretation discusses
some reasons behind our speciﬁcation of the political trade oﬀ in such terms.
Also for the moment we assume that all individuals are ex ante identical in
terms of their wealth, so the costs of expropriation for each individual is the
same and we label it bw. S i n c ew ea s s u m et h a tw is for the moment identical
for everyone, we normalized it to 1.
Whether good or bad, a new reform can be blocked by a (super) majority
M of individuals, once the aggregate shock on preferences “a” is realized. We
deﬁne M the “degree of insulation”: if M is high, only a large majority of
voters can block the reform. On the contrary, a low M means that when in
oﬃce the leader is checked by a large fraction of the electorate. Thus a leader
passes a reform only if a fraction (1 − M) of the population favors it or can
expropriate only if (1 − M) of the population does not object to this policy.
4The following speciﬁcation builds upon Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) and Aghion and
Howitt (1998, Ch.9) on the political economy of vested interests.
4Note that when M<1/2 then supermajorities are needed to pass legislation.
Also, in order to expropriate the leader has to ”buy oﬀ” a fraction (1 − M)o f
the population in order not to be blocked. Thus, ex ante each individual in the
polity faces probability M of being subject to the expropriation, if the latter is
not blocked.
The model, then, identiﬁes a trade oﬀ at the constitutional stage: a more
insulated leader can be less easily blocked, so the probability that a good re-
form passes is higher, but individuals are also more likely to suﬀer losses from
expropriation. The choice of M occurs ex ante, before the realization of “a”
and the size of M cannot be made contingent upon the realization of a.T h u s ,
we assume that the corresponding events cannot be described ex ante, and we
rule out social contracts contingent upon messages that voters would exchange
ex post about the realization of these random variables. For the moment we
assume that the e λi are not observed by the politician and that the politician
cannot compensate the losers. We analyze the case in which the constitutional
choice on M is made behind a complete veil of ignorance; that is, all individuals
are identical and learn their “λi” after the constitutional choice is made.
In summary, the timing of “events” is as follows:
i) M is chosen at the constitutional stage, by individuals behind a veil of





ii) λi is realized;
iii) the politician proposes the reform or the expropriation;
iv) the uncertainty on the distribution of ex post preferences is realized;
v) blocking of the reform may occur; the reform is implemented if and only if
it is not blocked by the voters; if the leader is ”bad” he expropriates, up
to the point that avoids blocking.
The motivation of this timing needs discussion. Stage i) represents the “con-
stitutional level” in which decisions are made behind a veil of ignorance. Stage
iii) is rather trivial. The only role of the politician is to promote a reform, that
passes if not blocked, or to expropriate the citizens. Steps iv), and v) capture the
post electoral “dynamics” between leader and voters. The latter implies that
after the realization of the shock “a” the voters still retain a choice to block
ex-post undesirable reforms. If the threshold for blocking M is set low, then the
voters insure themselves that they will have a “voice” ex post. However, this
makes reforms easily blocked. On the other hands, if M is high, reforms pass
more easily, but a larger fraction of the population may be expropriated, thus,
ex ante, the probability that each person is taxed is higher.
52.2 Interpretation
There are four critical elements in our model that need discussion. The ﬁrst
one is our notion of “reform”. If λmγ > 1 the reform embodies an element
of eﬃciency, but also may involve winners and losers. Note that the param-
eter γ allows us to shift the overall beneﬁt of the reform keeping the median
voter and the distribution of voters unchanged.5 Examples of policy reforms
that we have in mind include trade liberalization reforms, competition or entry-
enhancing policies, deregulation, labor market reforms, reforms of the social
security system or ﬁscal adjustment packages to eliminate deﬁcits. These re-
forms may ex ante favor a majority, but create net costs for a minority. Ex
post, as a consequence of aggregate uncertainty, the distribution of costs and
beneﬁts may diﬀer from the ex ante one, and, as a result, the distribution of
those in favor and against the reforms may change over time. The reforms for
which λmγ < 1 favor a minority but are harmful to the majority, at least ex
ante, although they may be not harmful ex post.
The second element is the structure of uncertainty about the realization of
voter preferences. The constitutional decision is taken behind a veil of ignorance,
before the realization of the parameter λi for all i’s and with all individuals
facing the same status-quo outcome in case reforms do not occur, an assumption
we shall relax below. The preference shock a has to be interpreted as a change
of the distribution of preferences occurring after the leader has taken oﬃce and
while he is implementing his policy. This is meant to capture the idea that
as a reform materializes through the eﬀort of a leader new voters come in or
the population at large ”matures” deﬁnitive preferences about the reform for
instance as they learn more precisely who will be a winner or loser form the
reform.
The role of the political leader in the basic model is highly stylized. A leader
is needed to promote the reform and to pass it (unless it is blocked). However,
the leader can take advantage of his position to expropriate. Obviously, if the
citizens could prompt reforms without a leader, expropriation would not occur,
but we emphasize the realistic idea that a centralized entity is needed to coor-
dinate the reform policy. Also the Constitution could prohibit expropriation,
but not reforms that would be a Pareto improvement. In reality it is diﬃcult to
fully restrain the authority of the government in this respect to expropriation
without restricting its ability to govern in other areas. We will return to this
issue below.
The third important element is the degree of insulation, captured by the
parameter M which we view as a “summary statistic” for a wide variety of
institutional rules that limit the power of appointed leaders. The most direct
interpretation of M refers to the question of what majority a government has
to command to pass legislation. In general terms the issue of the ”optimal
5We could achieve similar eﬀects by setting γ = 1 and varying λm. However we prefer this
notation, which also makes it easier to analyze inﬁnite horizon extensions (see Section 4.4).
6supermajority” rule is a widely debated question by Constitutional theorists.
Those who favor supermajority rules (low insulation) worry about limiting the
power of appointed leader and about the tyranny of the majority. Those who
oppose them view the (simple) majority rule as the essence of democracy.
The real world example closest to the letter of the model would be a popular
referendum on policy, an institution that is however, reasonably seldom used. In
this case the most extreme form of non insulation would be a referendum that
requires a majority of 100 per cent to pass legislation, so that any individual
voter can block policy. This institutional arrangement would set expropriation
to zero, but would make it impossible to pass any legislation which is not a
Pareto improvement. Given that referendum is rarely used, in the majority
of institutional settings blocking takes place indirectly, within the institutional
structure of delegation.
In the case of Presidential regimes like the US, one can view the Presidential-
Congressional relationship as a key element of the system of checks and balances6.
In parliamentary democracies the question of “insulation” refers to the control
over the power of the Prime minister and the relationship between majority and
minority in parliament. For given size of the parliamentary majority the power
of the executive, the agenda setter, is also determined by the voting rules within
the parliament, an issue that has received much discussion in the literature7.
Various voting rules governing procedures within legislatures can be interpreted
as giving more or less insulation to the executive, i.e. in most cases the “leader”
w h oh o l d sam a j o r i t y 8. For example, an important distinction is one between
”open rules” and ”closed rules” in parliamentary voting. With open rules the
legislature has a vast latitude in amending policy proposals of the agenda setter
(the government); with closed rules the government can prevent amendments
to its proposals and, as a result, it has a larger strategic power. One may a
priori associate open rules with low insulation (low M) and closed rules with
high insulation (high M), since they imply diﬀerent degrees of strategic power
for the executive. A vast literature on “ﬁscal institutions,” emphasizes the dif-
ferent eﬀects on ﬁscal policy of “hierarchical” versus “horizontal” systems. Key
elements deﬁning the former are rules that make it easier for the executive to
overcome Parliamentary opposition in passing the budget. On the contrary
”horizontal” institutions are those for which at every stage of the process large
consensus is required to pass ﬁscal policy decisions. The evidence shows that
“hierarchical” institutions are associated with faster and more eﬃcient ﬁscal
reforms and ﬁscal adjustments when needed9. Similar arguments apply to “fast
6This is a point already made by Hayek (1960). See Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) for an
extensive formal discussion of this issue.
7See for instance Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Baron (1991). On bicameralism see
Diermeier and Myerson (1995).
8In some cases we can have minority governments, in which the executive does not com-
mand a simple majority in the legislature. See Persson and Tabellini (2000)
9See the volume edited by Poterba and Von Hagen (1999) for an extensive discussion of
7track” legislation in trade. This procedure is viewed in the US as critical for
the implementation of free trade agreements, which otherwise might be blocked
by various special interests.10
Another important element of insulation refers to the role of the judiciary.
A well functioning and truly independent judiciary system can “block” reforms
when they depart from proper constitutional grounds. La Porta et al. (2002)
distinguish between a British style and American style judiciary as a guarantee
of freedom, as in Hayek (1960). The former restricts the power of the ruler to
interfere with the administration of justice, the latter gives more power to the
judiciary by allowing it to interfere more in the legislative process by checking
its adherence to the will of the people sanctioned by the constitution11.I n f a c t ,
the role of the Courts in American history has been extensive. In a famous case,
in 1893 the Supreme Court blocked the introduction of a federal income tax and
it took the Sixteenth amendment of the Constitution, almost 20 years later, to
overcome this block. Skocpol (1992) discusses how the role of the Courts in US
history inﬂuenced and shaped the evolution of its welfare state through a series
of “blocks” of welfare policies in defense of property.
Finally, with regard to the role of legislative institutions, a broad interpreta-
tion of “M” could include a comparison of diﬀerent electoral rules. Proportional
rules tend to produce political systems in which “governing by coalition” is the
norm, rather than the exception. In majoritarian systems, the majority party
can govern with fewer constraints.12 Even more broadly, one could also use
“M” to compare dictatorship or oligarchy versus fuller democracy. In a sense,
one can think of a dictatorship as a system in which a ruler, when in oﬃce (no
matter how he gets there), is uncontrolled, while an essential element of democ-
racy is some sort of checks and balances on the politicians, above and beyond
the fact that the latter are elected.
Finally some readers may ﬁnd that we simplify too much and that we ignore
too many details of institutional design. There are two answer to this criticism.
A more apologetic one is to say that one has to start with a simple model
and further research will add complications and institutional details. We discus
some of these issues in the Conclusion. The more ”aggressive” response is that,
in fact perhaps the details of institutional design do not matter that much and
the fundamental issues of supermajorities, insulation and veto power are critical
these issues. The choice of status-quo point in case the parliamentary negotiation process
fails, for example when discussing the budget, also aﬀect the extent to which the political
system insulates agenda-setters; see Aghion and Bolton (1997) for a detailed discussion on
this point, with reference to the constitutional change in France in 1958.
10See Grossman and Helpman (2001).
11La Porta et al. (2001) classify 71 constitution along the ”British- American” dimension
and ﬁnd that the American system is a better predictor of political freedom, while the British
system is a better predictor of economic freedom.
12Persson and Tabellini (2001) and Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) present
recent studies which compare proportional versus majoritarian systems concerning ﬁscal policy
choices.
8regardless of the details of diﬀerent systems. We believe that there is an element
o ft r u t hi nb o t ha r g u m e n t s .
3 Solution of the Model
We proceed by backward induction. In stage vi) the voters with low e λi oppose





The realization of “a,” for given M, determines whether or not the reform passes
or not. The reform will pass if and only if:
b λ − (λ + a)
l
<M
or a>b λ − λ − lM. Therefore, ex ante the expected utility of the generic




























Obviously for b λ−λ−lM > A the reform would never pass, while for b λ−λ−lM <
−A the reform would always pass. The ﬁrst two terms in (3) represent the
expected beneﬁts of the socially eﬃcient reform (multiplied by the exogenously-
given probability of such an event, p), the second the expropriation. Note that
ex ante behind a veil of ignorance and with risk neutrality the generic voter acts
as the “average” voter. Looking ﬁrst for an interior solution to maximizing (3)











whenever the RHS of (4) is positive. If the RHS of (4) is negative, then the
optimal insulation level will be
M∗∗ =0 .
One can then immediately establish:
Proposition 1
The preferences of voters are single peaked on M∗ and the optimal degree
of insulation is either zero or it is interior to the interval (0,1) and equal to the
9expression above if positive. In the latter case, the following comparative static
properties hold:
dM∗
db < 0; dM∗
dγ > 0; dM∗
dp > 0; dM∗
dl > 0; dM∗
dA < 0.
Proof: By inspection.
Several comments are in order.
1. First, note that in the absence of expropriation (b = 0) (or with no bad
leaders, p =1 )w eh a v e :
M∗ =1 /2.
This result follows from risk-neutrality and the utilitarian nature of the
maximization problem in (3) but it extends to more general distributions
of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks on preferences, as we show in Ap-
pendix. The intuition is as follows13. Suppose there were only two alter-
natives, x and y to be chosen between ex post. Ex ante the individuals in
the constituency (of size normalized to 1) are under the veil of ignorance
and do not know whether they will prefer x or y. Suppose k is the number
of individuals that prefer x to y. If an individual has ex post income α
if her preferred alternative is selected and income (−β) if the other al-
ternative is chosen, then under risk-neutrality the ex ante total utility of
choosing alternative x, is equal to:
U(x)=αk − β(1 − k);
similarly:
U(y)=−βk + α(1 − k)
if alternative y is chosen. Choosing M =1 /2 will then guarantee that the
alternative that maximizes total ex ante utility is always chosen, namely
x whenever k>1/2, and y otherwise. This reasoning extends to collective
decision problems like ours that boils down to a utilitarian maximization
problem: if M>1/2( r e s p . M<1/2) then reforms would take place
too (resp. not suﬃciently) often from the standpoint where voters expect
their preferences for reform to lie ex post.
2. Insulation is decreasing in the probability (1 − p)o fe x p r o p r i a t i o na n di n
the loss b from it. Thus, low protection of property rights (i.e. higher
scope for expropriation) would require lower insulation.
3. Insulation is increasing in γ, the average beneﬁt of the reform. With more
expected beneﬁt from the reform, the voter behind a veil of ignorance is
willing to accept a higher risk of expropriation in order to increase the
probability that the reform passes.
13This was kindly suggested to us by Matthew Jackson and it builds on Rae (1969).
104. Insulation is decreasing in A and increasing in l. In order to gain intuition
about these last two results it is useful to study the ex ante probability
that the policy reform passes (i.e. the probability that the fraction of





















Note, ﬁrst, that the implementation probability φ is increasing in l. This
is because M represents the required fraction of individuals necessary to
block the reform, so that Mlis the required number of blocking individuals.
Thus, the higher l, the more an increase in the fraction M will increase
the probability that the reform is not blocked, and therefore the higher
the expected gain from increasing insulation.
Second, ∂φ(M)/∂M = l/2A is decreasing in A. This can be interpreted as
a status-quo bias eﬀect of uncertainty. In order to gain intuition, consider
ﬁrst the special case where l = λ =1a n dM = 1
γ =1 /2; in this case, the
reform will be not blocked whenever a>0, that is with probability 1/2,
for any admissible value of A. Next, suppose that M =1 /2 > 1
γ; then, the
reform will pass for all a’s such that a +1 /2 > 1
γ, that is for all positive
realizations of a and also for a ∈ ( 1
γ − 1/2,0); the higher A the smaller
the set ( 1
γ −1/2,A] relative to the overall support [−A,A]; in other words,
higher aggregate uncertainty will increase the relative weight of blocking
losers among the whole set of voters; similarly, when M>1/2 > 1
γ, then
the reform will pass for all a’s such that a+M>1
γ, that is for all positive
realizations of a and also for a ∈ ( 1
γ − M,0); once again, the higher A,
the smaller the set ( 1
γ −M,A] relative to the overall support [−A,A]. So,
to the extent that with no aggregate uncertainty (A = 0) and for given
M the reform would not be blocked, then more uncertainty decreases the
eﬀect of increasing M; that is it increases a status quo bias14. The status-
quo bias eﬀect in turn implies that an increase in aggregate uncertainty
of the reform outcome, measured by A, should reduce insulation: a higher
A reduces the extent to which increasing insulation helps increasing the
probability of reform while the expropriation cost of increasing insulation
remains unaﬀected by A.
14For a diﬀerent and insightful model of status quo bias in policy reforms see Fernandez
and Rodrik (1990)
114E x t e n s i o n s
4.1 Polarization of Preferences
Let us now investigate the case of a non linear distribution of λi. In order to
keep things simple we introduce a very stylized form of non linearity in the
distribution, namely, we assume that a point mass ∆(≤ 1/2) is now added to
the two extremes of the distribution [λ,λ]. Obviously the median and average
point of the distribution, λm, does not change. The reform will not be blocked
if and only if:
b λ − λ − a
l
(1 − 2∆)+∆ ≤ M



























(b λ − λ −
(M−∆)l

































The optimal degree of insulation within a system depends positively on the





The implication of this result is that more polarization of preferences lead
to more insulation. To better understand this result, consider for a moment the
alternative case where polarization only occurs at the bottom of the preference
distribution, i.e. where there is a probability mass of ∆ at λi = λ only. In this
case the reform would not be blocked ex post whenever:
b λ − λ − a
l
(1 − ∆)+∆ ≤ M,




((λm(1 − ∆)+λ∆)γ − 1)l + lγ
µ








12In this case an increase in the degree of polarization ∆ would have an am-
biguous eﬀect on insulation. On the one hand, if we abstracted from its negative
eﬀect on the expected return from the reform (λm(1 − ∆)+λ∆), an increase
in polarization would increase insulation as formally proven in Appendix. This
choice would be justiﬁed to avoid opposition to reform by the lower tail of the
preference distribution. On the other hand, the fact that more polarization at
the bottom also reduces the expected reform outcome leads to an ambiguous
overall eﬀect of downward polarization on insulation; this latter eﬀect is elim-
inated in the case analyzed above where polarization occurs symmetrically at
both ends of the preference interval and individuals are risk-neutral. In the next
section we shall see how polarization interacts with risk aversion.
4.2 Risk Aversion
Let us now return to the basic model, with no polarization of preferences, that
is ∆ =0 , and a uniform distribution of λi, but let us add a very simple form of
risk aversion, with ex post individual utilities being given by:
u(yi)=
½
yi if yi ≥ θ,
−u otherwise,
where yi is ex post income and where u>0. Thus, only if income is above a
threshold θ w eh a v et h es a m eu t i l i t ya si nt h eb a s i cm o d e l .W ea s s u m et h a tt h e
status quo outcome is always above such threshold (i.e. θ < 1) linking more
tidily risk aversion and reform. Moreover, for simplicity we take the probability
of a bad reform to be zero, i.e. p =1 . Incidentally, this also shows that with
risk aversion one obtains a well deﬁned interior solution for M∗ even without
expropriation.































given that, in case of reform, the bad outcome occurs to every i for whom
(λi + a)γ < θ. To further simplify the algebra we assume the threshold θ to be
0; in this case suﬃcient conditions to have risk aversion operative are that λ ≤ 0
and that the reform is ex ante eﬃcient, i.e. λmγ > 1. Such restriction on the
parameter space are meant to make the analysis under risk aversion meaningful.
Tedious, but straightforward maximization leads to the following:
M∗ =
1+lγ + u −
p
(2uγl + u2 +2 γl)
lγ
Proposition 3
13The optimal degree of insulation within a system depends negatively on the





Thus, more risk aversion leads to lower insulation: in choosing insulation,
ex ante the voter takes into account the risk of falling below 0 ex post. Thus,
more risk aversion leads to choosing a system were ex post policy reforms can
be more easily blocked.
Now let us reintroduce polarization of preferences with a positive mass of
individuals ∆ at both ends of the interval [λ,λ], as in the previous subsection.
Also let us set for simplicity such an interval to be symmetric around zero, i.e.
λ = −λ.
Proposition 4







∆,u is the optimal degree of insulation for this case which is explicitly
deﬁned in Appendix.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is straightforward: more polarization increases
the risk of ending up at the bottom of the preference distribution, which in turn
leads to a low income when the reform is implemented; reducing insulation will
limit that risk.
4.3 Compensation
In general, those who are net losers from a policy reform can be compensated by
transfers, even though the latter will generally induce welfare costs, such as the
costs of distortionary taxation. Suppose that after M is chosen, a ﬁxed amount
of resources ω can be raised from all individuals through taxes, and assume for
simplicity that taxes are raised before the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks
on preferences are realized. Note that this implicitly assumes that any increase
in income obtained through the reform cannot be used to compensate, since the
amount available for compensation is ﬁxed ex ante. The maximum amount of ω
is w which represents initial individual wealth. The only purpose of taxation is
to compensate losers for the reform, which means that if the available resources
for compensation exceed the needs they are returned lump sum at no cost and
the leader does not retain any revenue for private beneﬁts.
The operation of this transfer scheme involves a positive deadweight cost k
per unit of taxed funds, and the net tax revenues are used by the politician to
compensate the required number of losers in order to avoid blocking. Ex post, for
given realization of the aggregate shock a, either more than (1−M) individuals
14are willing to support the reform even without any compensation (this will be
the case whenever b λ−a−λ
λ−λ <M), in which case no compensation will take place;
or passing the reform requires compensations to be made (this will be the case
when b λ−a−λ
λ−λ >M: the politician needs to compensate the fraction b λ−a−λ
λ−λ −M
of individuals for potential loss of utility due to the reform). Compensations are
paid to enough individuals who would, ex post, vote against the policy reform, in
order to keep them in. Obviously, the “cheaper” individuals are compensated,
i.e., those closer to the cut point of indiﬀerence between having or not having
the reform. This, however, requires that the preferences of individual are ex post
observable, since compensations are made dependent on them. If preferences
are not observable, either transfers scheme are not operational or they require
some revelation mechanism. We do not explore this question here.








Obviously if λ + lM > b λ − a, no compensation is needed. Straightforward
manipulation leads to:
c(a)=
(b λ − λ − lM − a)2
2l
A policy reform will pass with compensation paid if and only if:
(1 + k)c(a) ≤ ω







, which will be true whenever ω is suﬃciently
large (i.e. enough funds have been raised); in this case reform will always take
place (as it will be always aﬀordable) and, at the constitutional stage behind a
veil of ignorance, the generic individual will choose M∗in order to maximize:
max{p(λmγ − kEac(a)) − (1 − p)bM}












(b λ − λ − lM + A)3
12Al
15The solution of this problem leads to
M∗
(1) =
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Therefore, from the results in cases (1) and (2), the following result holds16:


























while the ﬁrst two terms represent the usual expected value of income.
16In case (1) a suﬃcient condition for individuals to opt for compensations at the con-























































































Let us note that the LHS is not deﬁned in k = 0, but it is continuous in k for any k>0.
If we consider the limit k → 0, it is possible to show that LHS diverges to +∞. Hence, by
16Proposition 5
When the compensation scheme is available and k is not too large, the opti-
mal degree of insulation M∗ (either M∗
(1) or M∗
(2) ) increases with the taxation
cost k; otherwise it satisﬁe st h es a m ec o m p a r a t i v es t a t i c sp r o p e r t i e sa si nP r o p o -
sition 1.
Proof: By inspection.
The basic message of this proposition is that a less eﬃcient system of trans-
fers should lead to a choice of more insulation (higher M)i no r d e rt or e d u c e
the need for compensation ex post.
4.4 A sequence of reforms
Consider a simple inﬁnite horizon extension of our model in which the economy
is populated by a continuum of non-overlapping dynasties of one-period lived
individuals. Each individual maximizes his current utility, and the game ana-
lyzed above is played repeatedly over time; in particular elections are held every
period and there is a countably inﬁnite set of reforms of vintage v, v+1,v+2,...
that can be implemented sequentially. So, income of individual i is as follows:
e yi =
½
e λiγν if v reform occurs
γv−1 otherwise
with γ > 0( 9 )
Since in each period all players face the same choices and the same objective
functions, except for a multiplicative constant, the optimal choice of M in this
dynamic environment will be the same M∗ as above in each period, as long as
it is taken before the realization of the shock. The average innovation rate of
our inﬁnite horizon economy is then simply equal to the average frequency of
















In particular, we see that the equilibrium rate of reform g decreases with
the probability and the cost of expropriation, with the degree of aggregate un-
certainty, A,(in the case of ex ante eﬃcient reforms) and it increases with the
average value added of a good reform as measured by γ. It is also possible to
continuity and the algebraic result that LHS is decreasing in k, it follows that there exists a
k such that compensation will be a viable alternative ∀k ∈ (0,k].
In case (2) a suﬃcient condition for individuals to opt for compensations at the constitu-
tional state instead of the no-compensation solution analyzed in the previous section, is:










obtained by substituting into (3) and (7) the optimal level degree of insulation in both cases,
respectively (4) and (8).
17compute the reform rate for the cases of polarization, risk aversion, and com-
pensation, and to derive the comparative statics properties. One interesting
result is that in the presence of a suﬃciently high degree of risk aversion (u)t h e
eﬀect of polarization is negative on the degree of policy reform.
5 The Political Economy of Constitutions
Thus far we have examined the case of a ”perfect veil ignorance’, behind which
everybody is identical. This, in a sense, is equivalent to a normative model
of constitutional writing. In reality, Constitutions are not written by social
planners, and veil of ignorance have holes in them. In fact, in virtually every
instance of Constitutional reform, a large amount of bargaining and conﬂict
occurs at the Constitutional table. One simple way of capturing the complexity
of the political economy of writing Constitutions is to generalize our model by
assuming that not everybody derives the same (known) utility from the reform.
More speciﬁcally, assume ﬁrst that individuals diﬀer ex ante with regard to
their willingness to reform, namely an “ε− individual” draws from reform an
income equal to:
e λε,i = e λi + ε,
and ε ∈ [ε,ε] is known and given before the realization of λi and a.
In stage vi) an ε−individual will be indiﬀerent between implementing or not
implementing the reform when:




Moving back to the constitutional stage, an ε−type individual would opti-









































We then immediately obtain:
Proposition 6






18while the comparative statics of M∗
ε with respect to A, l,b,p, and γ remain the
same as in Proposition 1.
Proof: By inspection.
Proposition 6 allows some interesting discussion concerning the political
economy of Constitutional writing. Suppose, for instance, that the Constitution
is decided by majority rule. In this case, the median voter, εm =( ε+ε)/2, would
prevail and impose his most preferred level of insulation, i.e. M∗
m. Alternatively,
if M had to be chosen by unanimity, any M∗ >M ∗(ε)w o u l db ev e t o e d .B u t
those individual with low ε, that is, those who are expected to beneﬁt more from
the reform (since they beneﬁt less from the status quo) may want to ”pay oﬀ”
the high ε−type to avoid their vetoing levels of M∗ >M ∗(ε). The result of this
bargaining process at the Constitutional table would depend on the bargaining
rules, the support of ε, and the voting rules on M∗.17
One could also think of a sort of “ﬁx e dp o i n t ”a r g u m e n ti nv o t i n gr u l e s ,
that is, one may want to argue that a choice of M∗ has to be approved itself
with a blocking rule M∗. That is, a Constitutional choice of M∗ can be vetoed
only by a M∗ (super majority). This is exactly the approach taken in diﬀerent
models by Barbera and Jackson (2001) and Polborn and Messner (2002). While
this self-stable solution is very elegant, its realism can be called into question.
In fact, voting rules and procedures to select or change the Constitution are
generally diﬀerent from the rules regulating the passage of “normal” legislation.
In general, the blocking coalitions needed to prevent changes in the Constitution
are lower than those required to block “normal” legislation. In fact, our model is
also suggestive of a reason why changing the Constitution should require smaller
blocking coalition (larger majorities). Constitutional change may bring about a
more uncertain distribution of winners and losers and voters may be especially
risk averse concerning radical changes of the rules of the game. Also one wants to
avoid that an elected leader can “easily” change the rules of the game restricting
entry of competitors. Low insulation may be required in institutional matters
for these reasons.
Ad i ﬀerent way to model a partial removal of the veil of ignorance is to
assume that only a fraction of “high λi” individuals choose M. That is, suppose
that only individuals with λi > λ∗ > λ choose the Constitution. It is easy to
show that the degree of insulation chosen is higher than in the case of complete
veil of ignorance. An interesting exam p l ei st h ec a s ei nw h i c ha tt h e“ b o t t o m ”
of the distribution of λi, say at λ we have a mass of individuals, ∆, not included
in the Constitutional process. The intuition is obvious: the minority that writes
the Constitution, by choosing a high degree of insulation, achieves the goal of
preventing the majority from ex post blocking policy reforms that favors those
who wrote the Constitution.
Ad i ﬀerent issue concerns the writing of Constitutions by minorities of
17Note that one could have diﬀerent ways of removing the veil of ignorance. One would be
to have diﬀerent evolution of the status quo, another is diﬀerent probabilities of being taxed,
ex post. The nature of our results are robust to these alternative modelling strategies.
19wealthy men, worried about the possibility of redistributive policies of future
majorities as the extension of voting rights progresses. In the language of our
model this can be interpreted as follows. Suppose that individuals’ wealth levels
diﬀer and wealth is distributed between w and w with a density f(w). Suppose
as before that the expropriation rate is b and those who sit at the Constitu-
tional table are in the upper part of the distribution of wealth, say between wm
and w with wm >w . Assume instead that everybody votes ex post and that
ex ante everybody is behind a veil of ignorance concerning the beneﬁto ft h e
reform, i.e. the λi. Clearly the wealthier share of the population that writes
the Constitution will choose a lower degree of insulation because expropriation
is especially costly for them.18 In other words, Constitutions written with an
eye on defending property rights against future redistribution of expropriation
will include a lot of checks and balances and requires supermajorities, i.e. low
insulation to pass legislation.
6 Empirical Implications and Discussion
In what follows we discuss several empirical implications of our theoretical anal-
ysis. Rather than a formal ”test” of the model we highlight several of its im-
plications that seem to shed light on some aspects of institutional choices and
economic development.
6.1 Economic Development and Institutions
A well known feature of developing countries is that they have not well func-
tioning ﬁscal systems. The share of transfers of GDP is larger in OECD coun-
tries than in developing countries, and more generally, the role of government
in transferring resources across individuals, the welfare state, is much more
widespread in richer countries. In the nineties the average for subsidies and
other current transfers as percentage of the current expenditure in the high-
income countries sample (World Development Report 2000-2001, Word Bank)
was about 60 percent. In the lower middle income countries it was 18 percent
cent in 1990 and 26 percent in 1997. Part of the reason is that it is easier to
collect taxes in more advanced industrial countries and also targeting towards
the truly deserving is especially diﬃcult. These considerations suggest that
developing countries should adopt more insulated systems of government, since,
in the language of our model they have a high k.
On the other hand, property rights tend to be less protected in developing
countries, and insulated leaders may have more latitude to pursue policies which
favor the leader himself and its close allies. The potential for “expropriation,”
broadly deﬁned, is larger in developing countries. This is captured by a higher
b in our model. One may argue that the technology of expropriation and of
18Details on the derivation are available upon request.
20taxing for compensation go hand in hand, to the extent that they both involve
collecting ﬁscal revenues. However, a compensation scheme involves a fairly
sophisticated system of targeting, while expropriation, especially in its more
brutal form, can be rather easy to accomplish to the extent that the government
has the monopoly of coercion, a monopoly which will itself increase with more
insulation.
These features put developing countries between an institutional rock and a
hard place. High insulation leads to high expropriation. Low insulation means
that policy reform are not implemented. In fact, we believe that this “steep”
trade-oﬀ between the possibility to implement reforms with winners and losers
and the likelihood that insulated leaders turn into dictators, may be one of the
key reasons for institutional failures in developing countries.
6.2 Polarization, fragmentation and Institutional Choice
Our analysis of Constitutional choice with an imperfect veil of ignorance of
section 5, shows that if a group which is not behind a veil of ignorance, knows
that the chosen policies will be in its favor (for instance because it is politically
dominant), then it will choose more insulated systems. 19 This subsection
brieﬂy explores this point empirically.
Measurement issues are diﬃcult. With regard to the main explanatory vari-
able, a particularly relevant, and reasonably exogenous, measure of political
polarization is an index of racial fragmentation, widely used in the literature to
explain economic performance.20 We use three indices. Two are the ”traditional
ones” used originally by Easterly and Levine (1997) and by many others after
them. One is an index based on an historical Russian classiﬁcation of languages;
t h es e c o n do n e( w h i c hw el a b e lA V E L F )i sa ni n d e xp r o p o s e db yE a s t e r l ya n d
Levine which is a average of ﬁve related linguistic indices. The third index is
new and recently constructed by Alesina et al. (2002) by combining linguistic
measures with other ethnic variables, like racial origin. In many ways we feel
that this new index improves over the linguistic ones, although, in any case, our
results are robust to the use of all three indexes. In all cases the index of frac-
tionalization is computed (as it is standard in the literature) as the probability
that two randomly drawn individuals form the population of the country belong
to two diﬀerent groups.
It is almost impossible to come up with a undisputable measure of ”insu-
lation” for a sample of more than a hundred countries in which institutional
arrangements vary on many dimensions. In Table 121 we choose two approxi-
mations of insulation. The ﬁrst one is a simple dichotomy democracy vs. autoc-
racy as the most general approximation for the separation between not insulated
19This eﬀect may be moderated by risk aversion as discussed in section 4.2.
20See for instance, Easterly and Levine (1997), La Porta et al. (1998), Alesina et al. (2002).
21A full description of data sources is given in the Appendix.
21and insulated countries. The second one refers to democratic forms of govern-
ment and we assign to presidential systems the role of ”most insulated” form
of government, Semi-presidential the middle level, and parliamentary systems
the least insulated. This choice is justiﬁed by the substantial reduction in the
number of veto players within presidential systems and their intrinsic winner-
take-all nature which distinguishes them from parliamentary systems22.I nf a c t
we checked that the unconditional correlation between the form of government
from Presidential to Semi-presidential to parliamentary and the Freedom House
index of political freedom is -.51, signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level, for the
sample of countries used in Table 1 and 3 below. That is more presiden-
tial regimes are associated with lower political rights, which we interpret as a
proxy for more insulation.23Results by Persson and Tabellini (2001) and Fatas
and Mihov (2002) suggest that ﬁscal policy in presidential regimes has a more
top-bottom discretionary nature than in parliamentary regimes, suggesting that
in presidential regimes policy is less constrained by various veto points in the
process.
Table 1 conﬁrms a positive correlation between the degree of polarization
and the degree of insulation using both indices of ethnolinguistic fractionaliza-
tion. More fractionalized systems are less democratic and more presidential.
Table 2 presents some regressions where the dependent variable is the democ-
racy index which, remember is deﬁned as decreasing i nd e m o c r a c y,c o n ﬁrming
that the correlations indicated in Table 1 survive after controlling for several
other economic and institutional variables. Without controlling for GDP per
capita the two ethnic fractionalization variables are statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1 percent level. GDP per capita may be endogenous, but, in any case in
two out of three cases the fractionalization variable remains signiﬁcant at stan-
dard levels. 24In the ﬁrst four columns we control for colonial origin, in the last
two for legal origin.25 Notably, French legal origin and Socialist legal origin are
associated with less democracy relative to the Anglo-Saxon system, which is the
omitted category. Finally, note that, with reference to the potential endogene-
ity of ethnic fragmentation, note that the bias should go against ﬁnding these
22For example, there is a relevant, negative (-0.501), and signiﬁcant (at 1 percent level)
correlation between presidentialism and a measure of political constraints within the political
arena (as presented in Henisz, 2002). For more discussion on insulation and presidentialism,
see Shugart and Carey (1992).
23Further analysis available upon request shows that this correlation holds up even when
controlling for a battery of other variables, including log of per capita GDP, school enrollment
ratios, regional dummies, openness.
24Our results are similar if we use the index AVELF. The results in Table 2 diﬀer a bit
from those reported by Barro (1996). Using a diﬀerent sample and a diﬀerent set of controls
he ﬁnds that his measure of ethnic fractionalization has the same sign as ours in a regression
explaining a democracy index but it is not signiﬁcant. In fact this author ﬁnds that almost
nothing except level of per capita GDP aﬀects his democracy index. However, many of his
controls are arguably endogenous.
25When we control for both sets of variable, which are highly collinear, results on ethnic
fractionalization remain unchanged.
22correlations. In fact, more insulated and less democratic systems should be
those more likely to engage in active policies toward reducing fractionalization,
such as expulsion of minorities, genocide, etc. 26
From the coeﬃcients reported in Table 2 one can compute the marginal
eﬀects on the probability of a political system of being less democratic. The
impact of a 1 percent change in ethnic fractionalization on the probability of
being in the less democratic group increases by about 0.14, using both measures
of fractionalization. Including income, the size of the marginal eﬀect is halved.
Table 3 repeats a similar analysis for presidential regimes. If we do not
control for income, the eﬀect of all measures of fragmentation is strong and
highly signiﬁcant. When we control for income the eﬀect of fractionalization
becomes weaker and in some speciﬁcation looses signiﬁcance at standard con-
ﬁdence levels. Note how former colonies, relative to non colonies tend to be
more presidential and how French and Socialist legal origin are associated with
more presidentialism than the omitted variable, Anglo Saxon legal origin.27
In summary, there is some evidence, although not overly strong if one con-
trols for GDP per capita, that in more ethically fragmented societies, political
systems are less democratic. We ﬁnd this result interesting because two strand
of cross country empirical literature have independently emphasized the eﬀect
of ethnic fragmentation on economic outcomes and the eﬀect of presidential-
ism and democratic status on politico-economic outcomes. These results seem
to suggest that the two sets of variables, institutions and racial fragmentation
are not independent form each other. Our interpretation, consistent with our
model, is that in more fragmented systems, political systems are chosen to in-
sulate certain groups and prevent others to have a voice.
6.3 Why Richer Countries Are More Democratic?
It is well known and it is also highlighted in Table 2, that richer countries tend
to be more democratic. Note that richer countries have better functioning ﬁscal
systems, which allows for transfers and social insurance, features that can be
interpreted as a lower k in our model, that is, lower costs of compensation. This
reduces the need for insulation and allows for better protection against socially
ineﬃcient reforms. A more stringent implication is that countries with lower
costs of taxation or better functioning welfare state should have lower insula-
tion. Interestingly Milesi Ferretti Perotti and Rostagno (2002) and Persson
and Tabellini (2001) ﬁnd that more proportional electoral systems are associ-
ated with a larger share of transfer payments. Proportional electoral systems
26A more subtle problem of endogeneity concerns the case in which individuals self-classify
themselves in certain ethnic or racial groups as a function of the feature of the institutional
system, for instance because certain groups or others are more or less favored.
27Both for the case of democracy vs. non democracy and of presidentialism we also
looked at other indices of fragmentation, in particular religious fragmentation. Results were
inconclusive.
23(as opposed to majoritarian) can be thought of as systems with low insulation
since they often require large coalition government to govern. These authors
interpret causality from the electoral systems to the welfare state; in this paper
we suggest that the alternative direction of causation may also be present.
One may also argue that in richer countries the beneﬁt of further “reform,”
captured by γ declines, almost by deﬁnition of being “rich.” This also leads
to a choice towards less insulation. Thus, one can argue that, as an economy
grows richer, the need for large reforms becomes smaller and, when necessary,
the losers can be compensated at low costs. Both factors lead to choosing
lower insulation. Also lower insulation helps protecting property rights against
expropriation.
Incidentally, low insulation may actually lead into some problems in ad-
vanced democracies. For instance, a vast literature surveyed in Alesina and
Perotti (1994) show that low insulation, as measured by electoral laws, systems
of government etc., may delay the implementation of ﬁscal reforms. In a sense,
this is the cost of insurance against undesirable (by some) ﬁscal reforms.28
6.4 Insulation, Inequality and Voting Rights
An important aspect of insulation concerns the protection of property rights
against expropriation, an issue heavily emphasized by Buchanan and Tullock
(1962). One can think of this issues in two ways. The rich (or, say, a racially
deﬁned fraction of the rich) can guarantee themselves favorable treatment by
choosing insulated constitutions knowing that they would always hold control
of political oﬃces.
Ad i ﬀerent way of looking at it is related to the extension of voting rights.
Consider a minority of wealthy men writing a Constitution, knowing that voting
right would be entered or that, more generally, a majority of voters may later
on choose taxation. If those at the constitutional table are a minority of the
wealthy, who may face, later on, the risk of being governed by the majority of
non wealthy, they may choose to constrain the majority when it comes to voting
on property rights. That is they would choose low insulation. This is the case
of an unequal distribution of wealth in which the rich choose the Constitution
but everybody votes on policy. Obviously, this would imply also low insulation
in terms of policy reforms, but to the extent that the rich cares mostly about
protecting property rights, in a period of extension of property rights, they
would choose to have more checks on the majority.
Hayek (1960) for instance, discusses how a ”constitution of liberty” has to be
based on limits on what the majority can do on the minority and he advocates
supermajority rules and judicial control to prevent redistributive policies. The
blocking by the Supreme Court of the income tax in 1894 in the US can be
28See also Spolaore (1995) for a discussion of the trade-oﬀs between majoritarian and pro-
portional systems with reference to ﬁscal policy.
24viewed in this light: an institution representing a relatively small minority of
the wealthy, and set up by the same constituency for that reason, was able to
impose (for 20 years) a certain ﬁscal policy in defense of the upper part of the
income distribution. F.D. Roosevelt’s struggle against the Supreme Court in the
thirties in an attempt to extend social protection is another famous example.
Roosevelt tried to undermine the Supreme Court and, in the language of our
model, to increase executive insulation in a variety of ways. His struggle was
partially successful, given that the Court felt threatened and started be more
malleable of social policies.29
Empirically, this implies that older Constitutions, chosen when voting rights
were restricted to a fraction of wealthy men, should prescribe larger majorities
(i.e. be less insulated) when it comes to taxation and protection of property
against redistributional reforms. To put it diﬀerently, older Constitutions would
make it easier to pass legislation that protects property rights, or, to put it
diﬀerently to block legislation that threaten property. Alesina, Glaeser and
Sacerdote (2001) argue that one reason why the welfare state in the US is
much less generous than in Continental Europe is precisely because the US
Constitution is an “old” one and was written by wealthy white men, keen to
protect property. More recent European Constitution, written when voting
rights were much more widespread, are much less concerned about protecting
property rights against redistribution, especially when it comes to protection of
property. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) note that “in a sample of 16
OECD countries, the correlation between social spending and the year of the
most recent constitution is 0.52”.
6.5 Insulation in Times of Crisis
A “crisis” can be deﬁn e da sas i t u a t i o ni nw h i c hap o l i c ya c t i o ni se s p e c i a l l y
desirable, even though not everybody may beneﬁt equally from such action. In
our model, then, we can interpret a “crisis” as a situation where γ is especially
high. The implication is, then, that one should observe a movement toward
more insulation in times of emergency. One extreme example is war time, when,
often, democratic rule is limited and even democratic countries adopt a more
hierarchical structure of power. In the terminology of our model, one can think
of “winning a war” as a policy with a very high γ requiring a very high degree
of insulation of leaders.
Less extreme examples involve reforms of economic institutions. For in-
stance, often Central Banks have been made more independent, in order to
“insulate” monetary policy, in periods of very high inﬂation, that is in periods
where anti-inﬂationary policies have an especially high γ. The most famous
example involves the Bundesbank and the German hyperinﬂation. The recent
adoption of ﬁscal rules with the European Union that limit the discretion of
29For an excellent discussion along these lines see Brinkley (1996)
25ﬁscal decisions on budget deﬁcits can also be seen as a response to the ﬁscal
crises of the eighties and nineties. In Latin America several institutional re-
forms leading to more ”insulation” of monetary and ﬁscal police from the ebb
and ﬂows of changing poetical majorities have followed the ”lost decade” of the
eighties.
7 Conclusions
This paper has moved some steps forward in analyzing the “endogenous choice
of institutions.” We have focused on one important, and general question of
institution design, namely how insulated political leaders can be ex-post, or to
put in reverse, how large the (super) majority should be to pass legislation.
Rather than reviewing our results, we highlight a few avenues of ongoing re-
search. One involves a more developed model of elected leader. For instance,
one could make the likelihood of success of a policy reform a function of how
much “eﬀort” the leader denotes into reform activity versus expropriation. The
choice of more or less insulation would then inﬂuence the incentives of leaders
and make their choice more interesting. For instance, a non-insulated policy-
maker may have very little interest in trying to “push through” reform if he
knows that ex-post can easily be blocked. On the other hand, a very insulated
leader may have stronger incentives to produce reform and legislative activity,
but he would also have more leverage to expropriate his citizens and even restrict
democratic rule. With a richer modelling of policy makers’ incentives one can
also study how the choice of policymakers and institutional rules interact; that
is the voters would choose diﬀerent leaders, more or less pro-reform, depending
on the institutional rules about ex post insulation.
A second direction of research is to model more precisely the electoral rule;
majoritarian (winner-take-all) or proportional. The composition of the elected
legislature would generate, in this framework, a collective level of “reform pro-
ducing” eﬀort, which would depend upon the composition of the legislature,
which in turn would depend on the voting rules. In this context one could
analyze how diﬀerent electoral rule lead to more or less legislative activity.
A third line of research is to analyze term limits as another form of insulation.
A leader facing short term limits may not feel particularly interested in putting
eﬀort in policy reform, especially if they require “time to build.” On the
other hand, without term limits incumbents may achieve an entrenched power
structure and restrict political competition. Once again the Founding Fathers
had captured the essence of the problem of term duration. In The Federalist
Paper n. 71, in fact, Hamilton puts it beautifully by writing that “It may be
a s k e da l s ow h e t h e rad u r a t i o no ff o u ry e a r sw o u l da n s w e rt h ee n dp r o p o s e d ;a n d
if it would not, whether a less period, which would at least be recommended
by greater security against ambitious design would be too short for the purpose
of inspiring the desired fairness and independence of the magistrate.” Good
26question.
8A p p e n d i x
8.1 Data description and sources.
Political data are from Beck et al. (2001), World Bank, Database of Political Institutions,
provided through DATAVINE by the Center for International Development at Harvard Uni-
versity. Data on form of government are from the variable SYSTEM, which in the original data
set is oriented with higher values for parliamentary systems, assigning to Direct Presidential
0; to strong president elected by assembly 1; to Parliamentary 2. We reverse the order to
make our results more readable in the variable PRES. So, for example, Peru will be assigned
a 2 in PRES, being a Direct Presidential Regime. All political variables are considered for
the years 1989-1990. For more detailed information about sources and deﬁnition we refer to
the original data set’s description of the variables available by the World Bank.
For data on democracy (political rights), Freedom House (2001), we refer to Easterly and
Levine (1997). Easterly and Levine are also the source for level of GDP in 1960, ELF60,
AVELF (the average of the indexes proposed in the original paper). Anyway, with regard to
the deﬁnition of Democracy in Table 1 we employ data from Persson and Tabellini (2001)
and consider their sample of pure democracies. With regard to fractionalization, ELF60 is
the soviet ethno-linguistic fractionalization index introduced in the empirical literature on
corruption. AVELF is the average employed by Easterly and Levine (1997) in the robustness
checks that maximize the sample size. We also use a third variable for ethnic fractionalization,
which is constructed by Alesina, Devleeshauer, Easterly and Wacziarg (2002). Data on colonial
and legal origin are from the CIA World Fact Book (2001 edition). Note that ”Other” legal
origin includes countries with legal origin diﬀerent from Socialist, French, and British, which
represent the benchmark to explain the coeﬃcients. Data on religious variables CATH, MUSL,
PROT plus on French, Soviet, and British legal origins are taken from La Porta, Lopez de
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999).
8.2 Proofs of propositions
Generalization of Proposition 1.
Let us consider a ∼ g(−A,A), where g(a)=dG(a)/da,and λi ∼ f(λ,λ) and





































































where we make straightforward use of integration by parts.
Now, by imposing the ﬁrst order conditions, we obtain:
−lg
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b λ − λ − lM
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Note: Most of the following proofs are purely algebraic and are included
mainly to facilitate revision.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 - r e l a t e dr e s u l t s .
• Case with symmetric polarization (probability mass of ∆ on both extremes in the
distribution of λi)
To pass the reform it has to hold that
b λ − λ − a
l
(1 − 2∆)+∆ ≤ M































































(λmγ − 1)l + lγ
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The second order conditions are veriﬁed by inspection.
• Case with asymmetric polarization (probability mass of ∆ on λ)
To pass the reform it is necessary that
b λ − λ − a
l
(1 − ∆)+∆ ≤ M































































((λm(1 − ∆)+λ∆)γ − 1)l + lγ
µ








f r o mw h i c hw ec a nd e r i v e dac l o s e df o r ms o l u t i o nM∗. Anyway, in this case the sign of dM∗
d∆
cannot be unambiguously determined because of the shift in the mean of the λs.
Now consider the case in which the individuals on the lower extreme are not included in




































(λmγ − 1) +
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d∆ > 0 unambiguously in this case.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
29Risk aversion model. We deﬁne the bankruptcy threshold as θ < 1.S o ,(λi + a)γ < θ
implies that bankruptcy happens for individual i and her utility plummets down at level
−u of utility (for example, because of bankruptcy costs).For simplicity we ﬁx p =1in this

































































































































1+lγ + u +
p
(2lγu + u2 +2 γl +2 uθ + θ2)
lγ
M2 =
1+lγ + u −
p
(2lγu + u2 +2 γl +2 uθ + θ2)
lγ












The solution has to satisfy M< 1
γl (1 + lγ + u). So we rule out M1. For the comparative
statics we now set θ =0and for λmγ > 1 and λ ≤ 0 (the assumption that the reform is





(2lγu + u2 +2 γl +2 uθ + θ2) − lγ − u − θ
p
(2lγu + u2 +2 γl +2 uθ + θ2)lγ
< 0
Which can be veriﬁed by expanding the part of the numerator that is not under the square
root as a square and confront this quantity with what is under square root.
30Also note that including expropriation would not change the results under the risk aversion
model, as the two eﬀects would add each other up in reducing insulation.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
We analyze the risk aversion model with symmetric polarization. Again we set the
bankruptcy threshold at θ (and we will set it equal to zero for simplicity when we derive
our results below). So, (λi + a)γ < θ implies a bankruptcy-related reduction of utility
down to level −u of utility. Also we have to recall that ∆ ≤ 1/2. For simplicity we ﬁx
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Now, by imposing the ﬁrst order conditions, we obtain:


































Let us impose for simplicity λ = −λ,θ =0 . The F.O.C. becomes:
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31and the ﬁrst solution is ruled out by SOC. Deﬁne M2 = M∗
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To prove this we just have to check that, considering the highest-order terms for u large
enough it has to hold that − u
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Index (ELF, from 
Easterly and Levine, 
1997)
AVELF Index (from 
Easterly and Levine, 
1997 )
Non- Democracy 0.504 0.532 0.386
[88] [53] [99]
Democracy 0.332 0.309 0.233
[60] [56] [60]
Direct Presidential 0.543 0.485 0.427
[68] [55] [70]
Semi-Presidential 0.484 0.516 0.303
[22] [13] [25]





Notes: The number of observations for the means are in the square brakets below. Data on 
ethnic and linguistic fractionalization are from Alesina, Devleeshauer, and Wacziarg (2002), 
while data on ELF and AVELF are from Easterly and Levine (1997). We classify a country a 
democracy according to Persson and Tabellini (2001) sample and definition based on Freed 
House political rights indexes. The Form of Government ordered variable is from the 
Database of Political Institutions, available from DATAVINE/ Harvard CID and the World 
Bank (Beck et al., 2001) for period 1975-1995. We consider the variable SYSTEM, 
complemented to 2, to facilitate exposition (Direct Presidential is assigned 2, Semi-
Presidential 1, and Parliamentary 0). ( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY
British Colonial Origin 0.248 0.294 -0.08 -0.112
0.261 0.29 0.26 0.274
French Colonial Origin 1.527 1.879 1.188 1.405
0.313** 0.368** 0.396** 0.397**
Spanish/Portuguese 
Colonial Origin 1.61 1.916 1.629 1.908
0.386** 0.411** 0.453** 0.463**
Other Colonies 2.416 2.878 1.978 2.047
0.349** 0.527** 0.468** 0.526**
Fraction of Catholic -0.016 -0.012 -0.01 -0.011 -0.011 -0.009
0.004** 0.004** 0.004* 0.004** 0.004** 0.005
Fraction of Protestant -0.021 -0.013 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.004
0.005** 0.006* 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006
Fraction of Muslims -0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001
0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.006
Socialist Legal Origin 2.877 8.195
0.343** 0.357**
French Legal Origin 1.087 1.36
0.266** 0.325**
Other Legal Origin -0.451 0.337
0.44 0.349
Ethnic Fractionalization 
(Alesina et al., 2002) 0.942 0.944 1.296 1.152
0.323** 0.424* 0.349** 0.425**
ELF60 (Easterly and 
Levine, 1997) 1.306 0.685
0.401** 0.402
Log(GDP) -1.055 -1.082 -1.126
0.169** 0.177** 0.166**
Observations 144 106 109 103 144 109
Table 2
Notes: Standard errors in italics below coefficient estimates. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Ordered probit coefficients reported. DEMOCRACY is index of 
Political Rights from Freedom House in 1980 (0 = most free, 6 = less free).( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
PRES PRES PRES PRES PRES PRES
British Colonial Origin 0.682 1.139 1.327 1.074
0.346* 0.421** 0.531* 0.511*
French Colonial Origin 1.867 2.681 2.737 2.719
0.368** 0.490** 0.653** 0.639**
Spanish/Portuguese 
Colonial Origin 1.673 2.563 2.054 2.486
0.508** 0.520** 0.620** 0.571**
Other Colonies 1.154 2.099 1.424 1.548
0.366** 0.544** 0.658* 0.605*
Fraction of Catholic 0.003 0.006 0.012 0.009 0.005 0.015
0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.006*
Fraction of Protestant -0.008 -0.001 0.011 0.008 -0.002 0.011
0.006 0.009 0.009 0.01 0.007 0.01
Fraction of Muslims 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.014
0.005* 0.006 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006*
Socialist Legal Origin 0.751 -0.404
0.311* 0.455
French Legal Origin 0.632 0.262
0.302* 0.334
Other Legal Origin -0.673 -0.647
0.607 0.652
Ethnic Fractionalization 
(Alesina et al., 2002) 1.335 0.624 1.664 1.207
0.450** 0.611 0.475** 0.567*
ELF60 (Easterly and 
Levine, 1997) 1.445 0.905
0.500** 0.531
Log(GDP) -0.54 -0.563 -0.698
0.210* 0.229* 0.213**
Observations 138 106 109 103 138 109
Table 3
Notes: Standard errors in italics below coefficient estimates. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Ordered probit coefficients reported. PRES represents form of 
government at the end of the 1980s (2 = Direct Presidential, 1 = Semi-Presidential, 0 = Parliamentary), data are transformations of the SYSTEM variable in Database of 
Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001). 